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FAIR TRIAL IN TRAFFIC COURT
Ross D. NETHERTON*
No ideal in Anglo-American legal tradition is more basic than
the ideal of fair trial. Expression of this ideal as a part of the law
of the land was one of the objectives of the English barons at
Runneymeade,' and was also one of the concerns of the framers
of the Bill of Rights of the Constitution of the United States. How-
ever, study of our legal system discloses a contradiction between
the belief in fair trial and the failure to practice it in the day-to-day
administration of justice. This is not the result of any basic weak-
ness in our ideals, or of active efforts to subvert them. Rather, in
the broadest view, it is a manifestation of the need for our legal
institutions to grow and adapt themselves to our changing social
institutions.
Nowhere is the strain of this process of adjustment more ap-
parent today than in our traffic courts. Partly the victims of cir-
cumstances because of the number and the nature of the offenses
that they must try, these courts often have been compelled to
function under conditions that are anything but conducive to the
best administration of justice, or calculated to reassure the public
that they are performing their proper or most useful role in the
conduct of government. To say that modern traffic court justice is
only a sham is obviously unfair to the many able jurists who are
working at all levels to improve this situation. But, on the other
hand, there is as yet no basis for saying that we have found the
answer to our traffic courts' dilemma. To some extent this is due to
the limitations within which the search for relief must be carried on.
Palliatives can ease but cannot cure their basic problems. Judicial
machinery can be driven faster, but it cannot perform tasks for
which it is unsuited or was never intended. But, most important,
legal reforms must not go so far in seeking efficiency that they
sacrifice the ideal of fair trial as a living symbol of the role that
courts play. History teaches that whenever efficiency has become
the dominant concern in handling a certain type of legal problem,
ways have been devised to relieve the courts of primary responsi-
bility for handling such problems. There are almost no lengths to
which we will not go in order to avoid destruction of the public's
*Legislative Counsel, American Automobile Association, Lecturer, Wash-
ington College of Law of the American University.
1. See Reprint of Magna Carta, paras. 17-22, 24, 36, 38-40, 45. S. Doc.
No. 180, 81st Cong., 2d Sess. (1950), Plucknett, A Concise History of the
Common Law 22-25 (4th ed. 1948).
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faith in the courts as the individual's defense against oppression-
as the one place where the individual can challenge his government
in all its majesty and omnipotence under circumstances which pre-
serve his' own personal dignity and protect him in his defiance
against reprisal beyond a just punishment for proven guilt.
Traffic courts today stand at the crossroads. They must care-
fully consider how much further they can go in modifying the pro-
cedure of criminal justice before they undermine the ideal of fair
trial. Route markings at this crossroads are confused, and .where
road maps show unknown areas, judicial cartographers have filled
them with pictures of dragons and hobgoblins. In this setting there
is urgent need for explorers who are willing to risk the unknown.
THE IDEAL OF FAIR TRIAL
In one sense the concept of fair trial is defined in the language
of the constitutional provisions, state and federal, that guarantee
certain procedural rights to the accused in criminal proceedings.
The Sixth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States is
specific as to the necessity of "speedy and public trial," an impartial
jury of the state and district wherein the crime occurred, informa-
tion as to the "nature and cause of the accusation," confrontation
with accusing witnesses, compulsory process for obtaining wit-
nesses for the defense, and the assistance of counsel. State constitu-
tions, in varying degrees, contain similar enumerations. 2 But the
constitution makers did not rely entirely upon enumerations, how-
ever elaborate. Indeed, they could not rest the matter there. In the
United States Constitution, the definition of fair trial must be under-
stood in terms of Article 3, describing the judicial power of the
United States, and the fifth and fourteenth amendments. Comparable
problems arise in attempting to arrive at a definition of fair trial
under the state constitutions. Here, phrases like "due process of
law" and "equal protection of the law" defeat the search for a
single, neat definition by injecting into the law of the land phrases that
are themselves synonyms for "fair trial." One cannot blame the
constitution makers for this, phrases like "due process" and "fair
trial" were meant as symbols of government, and as mandates for
all the judges of all the courts in all the years to come.
So the courts have been left to hammer out the working defini-
2. See, e.g., N.H. Const., Pt. 1, arts. 14-15, 17-19; Ala. Const., art. I, §§
6, 7, 11, Mo. Const., art. I, §§ 18(a), 18 (b) , Va. Const., art. I, § 8, Wyo.
Const., art. I, §§ 8, 9, 10; Kan. Const., bill of rights, § 10; Ill. Const., art. II,§§ 2, 9; Ga. Const., art. I, § 1, paras. 3, 5, Ohio Const., art. I, § 10; N.J.
Const., art. I, § 10; Wash. Const., art. I, §§ 21, 22, Conn. Const., art. 1,
§§ 9, 10; Pa. Const., 6th amend., Colo. Const., art. II, §§ 16, 23.
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tion of -fair trial day by day, and case by case. Frequently their
pronouncements have been so general as to become almost cryptic.
For example: "A fair trial, is a proceeding 'which hears before
it condemns, which proceeds upon inquiry, and renders judgment
only after trial.' ,,3 Or, fair trial "means a trial which insures the
doing of substantial justice in the interest of the public."' Other
decisions seek to isolate the elements of fair trial, singly or by
groups, after the fashion of the constitutional enumerations. It is
clear from these decisions that observance of principles is more
important than observance of forms.5 Also, it is not expected that
courts will achieve perfection, procedural techicalities will be
overlooked as long as the trial is free from defects in matters of
consequence, or, as the courts say, "material" or "substantial"
matters.6 The impartiality of the judge and jury are, of course,
essential elements of fair trial.7 So is the necessity of due notice and
effective opportunity to offer a defense.8 Failure to hear a material
witness, 9 failure to permit the accused to testify, 0 improper conduct
or remarks by the judge or prosecutor ." all may destroy the fair-
ness of trial. Undue delay and undue speed in bringing a case to trial
must both be avoided.1 2 The atmosphere of the trial is also impor-
tant, not only as it affects the willingness of witnesses to tell the
truth, but also the willingness of jurors to believe it.a
Court decisions thus add substantially to the constitutional defi-
3. Johnson v. City of Wildwood, 116 N.J.L. 462, 464, 184 Ad. 616, 617
(1936).
4. Capone v. Union County Park Commission, 9 N.J. Misc. 1105, 1106,
156 AtL 782, 783 (1931).
5. State v. Pryor, 67 Wash. 216, 219-20, 121 Pac. 56, 58 (1912).
6. State v. Haffa, 246 Iowa 1275, 1286-87,71 N.W.2d 35, 42, cert. dcned,
350 U.S. 914 (1955).
7. Fisher v. State, 145 Miss. 116, 133-34, 110 So. 361, 365 (1926), Gil-
land v. Comonwealth, 184 Va. 223, 235, 35 S.E.2d 130, 135 (1945).
8. Amrine v. Tines, 131 F.2d 827, 833 (10th Cir. 1942).
9. Wong Kew ex tel Wong Yook v. Ward, 33 F Supp. 994, 997 (D.
Mass. 1940).
10. People v. Rak:ec, 260 App. Div. 452, 457, 23 N.Y.S2d 607, 612
(1940).
11. State v. Hudson, 358 Mo. 424, 425-26, 215 S.W.2d 441, 442 (1948),
State v. Carter, 233 N.C. 581, 583, 65 S.E.2d 9, 10 (1951).
12. Di Maio v. Reid, 132 N.J.L. 17, 18, 37 A.2d 829, 830 (1944).
13. Fisher v. State, 145 Miss. 116, 110 So. 361 (1926). Also of interest
is the statement m Sunderland v. United States, 19 F2d 202, 216 (8th Cir.
1927) "Fair trial means a trial conducted m substantial conformity to
law before an impartial judge, an impartial jury, and m an atmosphere of
judicial calm. that the acts and language of the prosecuting attorney are
subject to control that the defendant shall have a fair opportunity
to outline his defense to the jury that right of cross-examination shall
be respected that the judge may not extend his activities so far
as to become m effect an assisting prosecutor or a 13th juror that, if
evidence of good character of the defendant is introduced, an adequate instruc-
tion shall be given touching the probative value of such evidence."
1957]-
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nition of fair trial. But this definition is constantly being expanded
and refined, and, in the last analysis, can only be understood in
terms of the purpose which it is designed to serve. Consider in tills
regard the statement that " 'a fair trial is one conducted in all
material things %n conformity to law.' "14 (Emphasis added)
The final phrase is the significant one, for it seems to indicate the
belief that, regardless of what particular formalities and procedures
were involved, the trial satisfied the requirement that it had been
conducted according to the "rule of law," and not the "rule of
men."' 5 It was therefore a "fair trial," and the court's rationale seems
to be that as long as the procedure does not depart so far from this
principle of government that it shocks the conscience of the public,
judicial procedure may be streamlined or modified without risking
rejection as a violation of constitutional rights. The test of fair
trial both for the appellate courts and all who would improve
the administration of justice is, therefore, a pragmatic one a trial
is fair if the procedure and events involved vindicate the belief that
all steps and all decisions involving material questions have resulted
from the application of established rules of law to facts elicited
in an orderly and uncovered manner. 10 In requiring compliance with
this standard, all other considerations are secondary, for the symbol
of fair trial is essential to maintaining confidence in, and securing
compliance with, the community's criminal laws.
Traffic courts, perhaps more than any other tribunals in our
legal system, must be scrupulous in their rules and practices since
it is there that the great majority of the public obtain their only
firsthand impression of the administration of justice. New Jersey
Chief Justice Arthur Vanderbilt has stated this most dramatically "T
14. People v. Riley, 191 Misc. 888, 892, 83 N.Y.S. 2d 281, 284 (1948),
Hill v. State, 76 Okla. Crim. 371, 381, 137 P.2d 261, 267 (1943).
15. Regarding fair trial in recent cases arising under the loyalty and
security program of the federal government, see Arnold, The Amcrican Ideal
of a Fair Trial, 9 Ark. L. Rev. 311 (1955). See also Arnold, The Symbols
of Government, c. 6 (1935) , Hardy, Truth, The Essential Element of
Justice, 27 Miss. L. J. 85 (1956).
16. For example, the question of whether due process was violated arose
in Breithaupt v. Abram, 25 U.S.L. Week 4148 (U.S. Feb. 25, 1957), where,
to determine intoxication, blood was extracted from petitioner while lie was
unconscious and unable to give his consent. In upholding the lawfulness of
this procedure, the court said. " due process is not measured by the yard-
stick of personal reaction or the sphygmogram of the most sensitive person,
but by that whole community sense of 'decency and fairness' that has been
woven by common experience into the fabric of acceptable conduct. It Is on
this bedrock that this Court has established the concept of due process." Id.
at 4149.
17 David Beecraft Memorial Award Address, National Safety Council,
1949. See also the 16 resolutions of the Conference of Chief Justices regarding
improvement of the administration of traffic court justice. These resolutions
were approved by the Conference of Governors in 1952.
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What they see and hear-and sometimes smell-in these courts
does not tend to create respect for law and for the judges
and lawyers administering law. And people are coming
to these courts by millions each year as defendants or as
witnesses in traffic matters-20 million as defendants in
1951-in comparison with the relatively small number who
experience justice from the courts of last resort in the state
house. These local tribunals collectively can do more to under-
mine respect for law than the appellate courts can possibly over-
come. From the judicial point of view this aspect of the work
of the traffic courts is quite as significant as the necessity of
curbing the constantly growing loss of life and property.
Thoughtful judges and-lawyers do not need to be told that our
lnd of government cannot exist long, once respect for law is
destroyed.
TRAFFIC COURTS AND TRAFFIC JUDGES
It is only within the past twenty years that professional organiza-
tions interested in improving the administration of justice have
begun to turn their attention to traffic courts. As a result, there still
is much to be learned about the way that courts throughout the
nation are handling traffic cases. At present, it is estimated that
more than 20,000,000 arrests or citations are made annually on
charges of traffic law violations.' Of course, not all of these cases
are disposed of by court trial. Nationwide statistics are sketchy,
but the American Bar Association has estimated that traffic courts
in cities of more than 10,000 population annually hear and decide
about 6,000,000 cases.' 8a Viewed in any context, this is an appalling
case load.
18. ABA, Report of Special Committee on Traffic Court Program, 136-
37 (1956). See also, 27 Uniform Crime Reports, No. 1 (1956). Based on re-
ports from 206 cities having over 25,000 population. The Reports show the
following: Total number of persons charged with motor vehicle and traffic
offenses during calendar year 1955 10,265,788. Total found guilty as charged:
7,439,762. Total found guilty of lesser charge: 47,908. Id. at 60-61.
As to release of persons not held for prosecution, 27 Uniform Crime Re-
ports, supra, show the following based on reports from 611 cities having a total
population of 22,413,731 Number of persons released after being charged
with traffic violations: 117,010 (522.0 per 100,000 population). Number of
persons released after being charged with parking violations: 899,318 (4,012.4
per 10,000 population). Number of persons released after being charged with
other traffic or motor vehicle lawv violations: 60,615 (270.4 per 100,000 popula-
tion). Id. at 63.
For comparison see Porter, The Traffic Court System, 31 J. Crim. L,
C. & P.S. 401, 405 (1940), who states that at that time traffic violations con-
stituted approximately 40% of all arrests.
18a. ABA, Report of Special Committee on Traffic Court Program,
op. cit. supra note 18, at 137 See testimony of Charles S. Rhlyne, Chairman,
ABA House of Delegates before the Congressional Committee studying prob-
lems of traffic safety. Transcript of Hearings of March 25, 1957, Before the
Subcommittee on Traffic Safety of the House Committee on Interstate and
Foreign Commerce, 85th Cong., 1st Sess.
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The great bulk of traffic cases are tried before courts of limited
jurisdiction at local government level. Municipal courts, city courts,
magistrate courts and police courts serve the urban and metro-
politan areas. Justices of the peace, trial justices, trial magistrates,
and similar courts serve rural areas and incorporated towns and
villages. Except in rare instances there are no "traffic courts" in
the sense of a separate tribunal, staffed by personnel specially
trained to deal with the particular evidentiary and psychological
aspects involved in traffic offenses, and organized to permit admin-
istrative matters to be handled with the greatest efficiency for
effective cooperation between the court and other agencies of
government whose activities are affected by the traffic problem.
This unfortunate circumstance of having traffic cases handled by
such a miscellaneous and heterogeneous group of courts is a major
stumbling block to any efforts either to improve the brand of justice
within the courts as they are, or to introduce changes in administra-
tion and procedure looking toward greater uniformity and effec-
tiveness.29
Use of state and county courts for the trial of traffic cases is
generally limited to instances where local government laws prevent
the extensive use of municipal courts. Understandably, state and
county court officials have not encouraged the docketing of traffic
cases. Since they exercise original jurisdiction in all serious criminal
charges, these courts are accustomed to cases involving lengthy trial,
complete with procedural safeguards at all steps in the trial, and
deliberate examination of situations involving many issues. Few
traffic law violations are of the seriousness or complexity that
typify the other criminal cases in these courts. Since they do not
fit into the regular business of these courts, traffic cases often tend
to be resented and disposed of impatiently at the beginning or end
of the day's business. Seldom do these courts have the benefit of
access to the defendant's past driving record, the physical equip-
ment with which to visualize the scene of an accident or alleged
violation during trial, or experience in the use of the particular kinds
of scientific evidence that traffic accident investigation squads pro-
19. Warren, Traffic Courts, c. 3 (1942), "The Courts Where Traffic
Cases Are Tried." It was Warren's conclusion that "Judged by any fair
standard neither justices of the peace nor the other courts mentioned work
satisfactorily in the trial of traffic cases. It should be apparent that the
very miscellaneous nature of the courts which generally handle traffic cases
precludes regularity of systematic adjudications. The use of different courts,
at different places, with different judges must naturally produce somewhat
heterogeneous results. But aside from this makeship organization there is
another and perhaps more basic criticism, namely, that these courts are not
in fact prepared to handle traffic cases." Id. at 24.
[Vol. 41:577
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-vide. Generally, also, state and county courts hold their sessions
at times and places not convenient to the public to appear for
trial. For these reasons, the trial of most traffic violations occurs
either in justice of the peace or other local courts, or else in special
branches of municipal courts assigned to traffic cases.
Justices of the peace and magistrates who preside over courts
in various units of local government comprise the largest group
of judges exercising traffic law'jurisdiction. In certain respects, these
courts provide a more satisfactory handling of traffic cases than do
state and county courts. They are not preoccupied with other more
important business. Their approach to procedural matters is simple
and direct. Physically these local courts are closest to the people.
But it is generally conceded that their shortcomings more than bal-
ance these advantages. Too often these courts are part-time tribu-
nals, housed in .inadequate quarters, staffed by personnel com-
pletely untrained in legal matters and lacking an appreciation of the
problems of traffic control, presided over by persons politically ap-
pointed or indiscriminately chosen in local election, and financed
by the fee system. With a good deal of justification, the justice of
the peace and his counterpart in the incorporated town or village
have acquired a reputation for "cash register justice" and "soakIng
the stranger" in traffic cases. By the undignified surroundings in
wlch many of them conduct their business, the haphazard pro-
ceedings, showing little apparent concern over the keeping of rec-
ords, the frequent reports of "bargaining" with the accused over
the plea or the amount of bond, their penchant for fees which exceed
the amount of the fine, and their tendency always to back up the
arresting officer, these magistrates have become an anathema to the
motoring public.
Evaluations of the standards of justice in justice of the peace
courts and other comparable local courts almost inevitably tend
to cite the fee system as a basic cause for their weakness. Originally,
in a time when taxation for local government services was practically
nonexistent, both the courts and the law enforcement agencies were
on a revenue basis to defray their expenses. The consequences of
this arrangement are common knowledge.20 Since fees generally are
collected only from defendants who are convicted, the system results
20. The following case is illustrative: In connection with an alleged stop
sign violation in a small North Carolina town, the accused was required to
post appearance bond in the amount of $27.45. Itemization of this amount by
the court was as follows: fine, $10.00; warrant, 35 ; bond, 600 ; ssuing
subpoena for witnesses, 150 each; preparing bill of cost 250; docketing in-
dictment, 250; judgment, $1.00; filing fee, 100; original process, $1.00;
docketing judgment, 250; indictment, $1.00; mayor's fee, $6.00; seal of
office, 500; arrest fee, $2.00; "county spec.," $1.00; "L.FO.B.&R. fund,"
1 1971
584 MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW (Vol. 41:577
in giving the magistrate an interest in the outcome of the trial. The
argument that no man should be trusted to decide impartially a case
in which he has a pecuniary interest received approval by the Su-
preme Court of the United States in 1927, in Tumey v. Ohio.2' But,
to the surprise of many, it has not marked the end of the fee system.
In 38 states the part-time justice of the peace and his counterpart,
the small town magistrate, continue to serve as the courts of trial
for a wide range of petty crimes, including traffic offenses, and as
the committing magistrates for more serious crnes."'
The explanation of why programs for the improvement of judi-
cial administration have not made better progress in this area
would appear to be twofold. One factor is the difficulty of the state
government to provide an alternative to the part-time, fee comi-
pensated magistrate.2 3 Many state budgets literally could not stand
the strain which would result from establishment of a state-wide
system of regular courts with salaried judges, even if necessar-
changes in the state constitution could be arranged.
A second factor is the widespread feeling that time and money
spent on "fighting the system" is wasted. To the motorist traveling
away from home for business or recreation speedy justice is essen-
tial. If he cannot have it, he will-because of the relatively small
amount of the penalty or appearance bond involved-forfeit his
bond, or else waive appearance and pay his fine. Yet in most justice
$2.00, Peace Officers Association Fund, $1.00. In the instant case, the
accused was a resident of Pennsylvania who forfeited bond because of in-
ability to return to North Carolina for trial. Had trial been held additional
fees for witnesses subpoena would have been charged. Letter from G. A.
Webb, Mayor of Franklinton, N.C., to C. D. Spitler, an attorney from Leba-
non, Pa., Nov. 25, 1955, containing a copy of the docket sheet and recog-
nizance bond in the case of State v. Yorty, then pending in the Franklinton
Justice Court.
The fee structure varies throughout the country. In Michigan, for ex-
ample, justices of peace are limited to $2.00 for parking violations. Where
moving violations are involved, the fee limit is $4.30 for a plea of guilty and
$6.50 where trial is involved. Fees are paid by the defendant where a con-
viction is involved and by the county auditor where an acquittal occurs.
21. 273 U.S. 510 (1927)
22. Warren, Traffic Courts, 21 (1942). A more recent survey by the
-\merican Automobile Association, begun in 1955 and completed in 1956, indi-
cates 40 states where justices of the peace are being used to enforce traffic
laws. In 31 states fees are allowed in connection with all arrests, and in 17
17 states the justice's fee was allowed only in cases of convictions. See also
Economos, Traffic Courts and Justice of Peace Courts, 25 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 66-
84 (1950)
23. Utah is a case in point. Bodenheimer, Manual for Justices of the
Peace in the State of Utah 124-25 (1956), points out that the statutory fees
have not been changed since 1898, and that the amounts are not only
inadequate but unworkable under present-day conditions. One Utah justice of
the peace is quoted as stating that "if the laws relating to fees are not amended.
the justices of the peace in Utah will sink to a low level. Qualified men call-
not afford to assume the responsibilities of such an important office on the pay
received."
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of the peace- courts speedy justice is unobtainable. In one small
town, having a national reputation as a "speed trap," traffic cases
are tried in a police court held every second and fourth Saturday.
In other courts it is the practice to require the accused to appear
twice: once to set the date for trial, and again for trial. Rather than
attempt to appear, together with witnesses, at such times, the
motorist takes a "pay-up-and-forget-it" attitude. Moreover, a trial,
once scheduled, is more likely to leave the defendant with a feeling of
rancor toward the system than a feeling that he has had a fair and
complete trial of hIs case. This no doubt goes far to explain not
only the great number of bond forfeitures and pleas of guilty in
such courts, but also the lack of interest in appealing convictions to
courts where the doctrine of Tuntey v. Ohio could be applied.
Although numerically fewer than the justices of the peace and
local magistrates' courts, municipal courts serving urban centers
and metropolitan areas handle the great majority of traffic cases. In
these municipal courts many progressive steps in the efficient ad-
ministration of justice in traffic cases have been developed. The
very fact that traffic cases comprise such a huge volume of the
court's business has compelled these courts to improve methods of
handling these cases apart from other business of the court and by
specially trained judges and court personnel. Naturally, however,
not all cities have the facilities, the trained judges and court per-
sonnel, to maintain the standards found in the best of these courts.
Where such conditions are absent, the chances for fair trial, as
viewed from the defendant's position, diminish rapidly. His reaction
in traffic court prompts him either to plead guilty despite his per-
sonal feelings regarding the charge, or else to stand trial with only
his own denial interposed as a defense to the testimony of the
arresting officer.
For Americans, to whom the courts stand as a fundamental
symbol of justice and the protection of individual liberty under the
law, this may seem a strange reaction. Yet the magistrate of a
New York City traffic court has recently been quoted as saying that
forty per cent of the motorists who appeared in his court pleaded
guilty despite the fact that they honestly believed they were in-
nocent.2 4 In Baltimore, a traffic court judge has stated, apparently
with satisfaction, that ninety-five per cent of his cases enter pleas
of guilty.25
24. Sontheimer, Traffic Courts-Blot on American Justice, McCall's,
June 1956, p. 27
25. Scherr, Teen Age Traffic Court, 31 Transactions, National Safety
Congress 56-58 (1952).
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To understand the actions of a traffic court defendant when he
steps to the bar to plead to the charge against him, one must step
into his shoes for a moment. Consider, for example, what he thinks
when he reads the charge against him. Recently it was reported that a
motorist in Los Angeles received a traffic citation charging him
with "violation of Article 5" of the vehicle code.20 It happened
that article 5 had eleven sections and twenty-one subsections, all
written in legislative language and related to other portions of the
code. This was his notice of the charge that determined the issues
and the evidence involved in his trial I Or, take the reported instance
of a housewife who received a traffic citation for failing to yield the
right of way 27 Her husband was amazed to hear of it because a few
weeks previous he had received a fine under the same section of the
code, for an incident at the same street intersection in which he did
precisely what the arresting officer said that his wife should have
done but didn't. Fifteen years ago, George Warren wrote in his com-
prehensive study of traffic courts that "the aim in all traffic rules
should be Simplicity ",28 However, today's motor vehicle codes are
so extensive and so frequently amended that few people can know
the law or understand the issues involved in the charges that are
tried in traffic court.
Consider, also, what a defendant thinks as he sits in traffic court
awaiting the call of his case. In some courts, he must witness a
series of cases involving the petty thief, the drunkard, the street-
walker, the vagrant-in short, the worst and most miserable ele-
ments of society The resultant desire of the motorist to get his
case over and get out as soon as possible is natural. But, even where
traffic cases are separated and heard by the court on "traffic days"
or where they are returned to a separate traffic division of the
court, the feeling of frustration is seldom overcome. In the Munici-
pal Court of Chicago, it is common to see each of three judges
assigned to traffic cases dispose of 600 to 700 cases a day Little
time is spent in reaching a decision, and in this regard it is of
interest to note the findings of Warren regarding all urban courts
The situation in our larger cities is illustrative. A judge entering
the courtroom may be confronted with anywhere from 200 to
1,000 traffic cases. Assuming a six-hour court day there will be,
on the average, approximately one-third of a minute to one and a
half minutes available for the disposal of each case I'l
26. Los Angeles Mirror-News, Aug. 1, 1956.
27 Ibid.
28. Warren, op. cit. sitpra note 22, at 16.
29. Id. at 112. Warren suggests that a trained judge can handle up to
115 non-accident cases daily, allowing an average of 4 minutes per case. In
[Vol. 41:577
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The consequences of such pressure are, as Warren found, irre-
parable. "The evidence of police officers and witnesses alike was cut
short, defendants were waved away by the judge while still giving
their excuses and the judgment of the court was given with one eye
on the clock. This type of trial all too often left convicted defend-
ants with the impression that they never had a chance." 0
The defendant's reaction to what goes on in traffic court is likely
to be shared by those persons who are not personally involved in
his case, but who have been asked to appear as witnesses. Thus, the
difficulty of obtaining witnesses for the defense must also be re-
garded as a result of the conditions prevailing in traffic courts,
and a factor in making fair trial difficult.
Mention should also be made of the violations bureau and the
effect of its practices upon the tendency to plead guilty rather than
stand trial. Violations bureaus-sometimes known as "cafeteria
courts"--are creatures of the automobile era. It is obvious that
traffic cases in urban and metropolitan areas are so numerous that
it is impossible to deal with them according to the same procedure
applied to serious charges under the criminal code. The theory of
the violations bureau is that in cases where guilt is admitted, and
which do not for other reasons merit a court trial, the defendant
may be allowed to waive court appearance and pay a prescribed
penalty at his convenience to an admimstrative officer of tlbe court.'
In this way the trial docket may be kept clear of cases involving
merely offenses against public convenience, allowing the judge to
spend more time on cases involving public safety in a real sense.
Some outstanding examples of effective use of violations bureaus
may be cited. However, many violations bureaus are seriously
handicapped in properly carrying on their purposes. Many of these
bureaus are located in police departments and staffed by police
clerical employees. For practical purposes they are completely re-
moved from the judge who by law is responsible for supervision of
their operations. The bad effects of this are often reflected in the
tendency of the violations bureau to accept forfeitures of bond or
payment of fines for violations of the law that involve serious
threats to public safety, or from persons whose driving records
this connection he cites what no doubt is the all time record. On January 15,
1936, one New York City magistrate heard 1,016 cases in two and one-half
hours. Id. at 33.
30. Id. at 113.
31. ABA and the Traffic Institute, Northwestern University, judge and
Prosecutor m Traffic Court 5 (1951), Warren, op. cit. supra note 22, at 56-65.
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indicate urgent need for some corrective measures.-2 Warren, in
his study of traffic courts, concluded that, "To put it briefly, viola-
tions bureaus in most cities seem to exist mainly for revenue pur-
poses and appear to be considered in that light by the motoring
public. 3
3
Thus the conditions under which traffic courts must perform
their functions are one important aspect of the problem of providing
fair trial for the motorist. Viewing the situation as a whole, there
are, of course, examples of traffic courts and judges in whom the
public reposes confidence and to whom it gives sincere support. The
trouble is that the gap between the best and the worst of the traffic
courts is great, and the great majority appear to be below the
standard which the community sense of justice demands.
TRAFFIC COURT PROCEDURE
Equally involved in the problem of fair trial is the procedure of
the traffic court. Two forces have been mainly responsible for the
current trend in traffic court procedure. One is the compulsion of the
case load, acting to force departures from the practices followed
where other crimes are involved. The other is the belief that if only
the accused violators could be brought into traffic court, their
sobering experience there--regardless of whether they were found
guilty or innocent-would make them more attentive to their re-
sponsibility as drivers to reduce accidents.3 4
Certain things may be singled out as the hallmarks of the "new"
traffic court organization and procedure. In an effort to eliminate
separate steps and papers for the arrest, the complaint and the
notice to appear, these features are sometimes combined into one
document issued to the accused at the time of apprehension by the
32. Surveys made by the American Bar Association's Traffic Court
Program have indicated the following" In Nashville (1952) 70% of all traffic
charges were disposed of in the violations bureau and 30% were tried in
court. In Indiana (1954) a survey of 33 cities showed 56,593 cases heard in
court, and 215,228 disposed of in violations bureaus. In Saginaw, Michigan
(1954), the combined 1952-53 reports showed 14,181 cases tried in coirt and
73,070 disposed of in violations bureau. In connection with the Saginaw
survey, the ABA report stated. "Except for the 'private hearing' feature of
the court's practice, there is little incentive to appear in court. The fine
schedule provided for the violations bureau permits payment of fines for any
number of offenses at low rates and without significant increase for succes-
sive offenses. This practice has no educational value or corrective value."
33. Warren, op. cit. supra note 22, at 59.
34. See Economos, The Traffic Problem, Traffic Laws, and Traffic
Courts, The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science,
May, 1953, pp. 13-20; ABA and the Traffic Institute, Northwestern Univer-
sity, Judge and Prosecutor in Traffic Court, c. 5, 14 (1951), Burton, Traffic
Prosecutor's Manual 1-2 (1950) , ABA, A Report on the Courts of Limited
Jurisdiction in the State of Indiana 63 (1954) , Fisher, Traffic Courts and
Driver Attitudes, 31 Neb. L. Rev. 227-36 (1952).
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police.- 5 In court, such a document becomes the entire basis of
the .prosecution. Or, when combined with a waiver of appearance
and plea of guilty, it may become the basis for the complete disposi-
tion of the case by the court or violations bureau. This device
is aimed at the heart of an old and vexing problem. Most traffic
violations are of such minor importance, both intrinsically and in
the amount of penalty involved, that they are not regarded as
justifying the paper work involved in going through the same pre-
trial steps used in other criminal-cases. Modern motorists, able to
travel across state boundaries with ease, cannot be served, or if
served cannot appear, to answer charges made through the historic
forms of criminal procedure. The argument for simplified arrest
procedure is thus a forceful one, but the success of any new combi-
nation of procedural steps in protecting the fairness of the subse-
quent trial must be weighed against the adequacy of notice to the
accused. Few criticisms have been stronger than those aimed at the
adequacy of the complaint. In areas where the complaint is still
prepared as a separate document, the tendency is to describe the
offense cryptically either by title or rote. Executed on forms pre-
scribed variously by the police department, the prosecutor's office,
the clerk of the court and the judge, these complaints often fail to
protect the accused from general and ambiguous charges and are
useless to the accused in preparing a defense. This defect has by no
means been overcome in the courts which adopted a uniform printed
form of ticket and complaint on which the arresting officer checks
a series of items describing the offense, the degree of seriousness, the
prevailing traffic conditions, and type of highway zone involved.
Because these categories are necessarily generalizations, the court
and the accused must still wait for the trial to hear testimony par-
ticularizing on the facts leading to the arrest.
In a few large municipal courts, efforts have been made to de-
velop for traffic cases a device similar in function to the master in
chancery or referee in a bankruptcy proceeding. Following the
opening of traffic court it is announced that all who desire to have
their cases heard before one of the several referees attached to the
court may do so immediately and avoid waiting for the daily call of
the court docket. Defendants appearing before a referee are heard
informally as they may care to respond to the charge against them.
Prosecution testimony may or may not be asked for. At the con-
clusion of the hearing, the referee makes a finding with which the
defendant may agree or which he may reject. If he agrees to
35. Indiana Legislative Study Comm'n on Traffic Safety, A Report on
the Courts of Limited Jurisdiction: Traffic Courts 68-71 (1954).
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abide by the referee's recommendation, he may pay his penalty and
leave, if he desires to contest the matter, he may have his case re-
docketed for a hearing before the judge. In this way cases that may
not be disposed of by the violations bureau are given a hearing and
disposed of without taking the time of the judge, except for certifica-
tion of the order in the case at the conclusion of the day's business."
Initial reaction to the use of this device has been mixed. Without
question it has provided a method of relieving the court of the
necessity of giving full hearing in open court to all docketed cases,
and in this way has allowed more time for hearings whzch are
serious, involve several issues, or are contested. But criticism has
been directed at the effects of the informality, the confusion, and
the crowded conditions that prevail. A referee may handle
several hundred cases daily His tendency is to announce to
the entire group waiting that those who wish to plead guilty will be
taken first and their cases disposed of without the necessity of
any hearing. As to those cases which receive hearings, the tendency
of the referee is to commence by asking the defendant "what he has
to say" in answer to the charges, postponing any examination of the
evidence supporting the charge until after the hearing of the de-
fense. The result is likely to be anything but reassuring to the accused
as he reflects upon the fairness of the hearing.
In contrast, some cities have developed a somewhat different
device for providing hearing prior to trial by utilizing the criminal
division of the corporation counsel's office.Y7 In cases where traffic
violations are charged in connection with motor vehicle accidents,
the parties and arresting officer are called before an assistant corpo-
ration counsel for conference. "Traffic boards" with movable model
cars are used to recreate the events involved. Considering in turn
the testimony of the officer and the parties involved, and any state-
ments of counsel, the corporation counsel makes a determination as
to what charges, if any, should be allowed to stand. Although not a
judicial determination, this procedure results in a reduction of the
number of cases that must be heard by the traffic court judge, and
the persons accused of traffic violations have full opportunity to
present their testimony and cross-examine personally or through
counsel.
The problem of advising the accused of his rights before the
court is one of the most sensitive parts of current traffic court pro-
36. The procedure described herein is used in the Municipal Court
of Chicago, Illinois. Comments of the author are based on personal observa-
tion and discussion with court officials and attorneys.
37 The procedure described is followed in the Municipal Court of the
District of Columbia.
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cedure. The defendant's procedural rights, either specifically guar-
anteed by statute or constitutional provision, or as a part of the
concept of due process, may be listed as follows fla
The right to counsel.
The right to obtain a continuance if necessary to obtain counsel
and prepare a proper defense.
The right to testify or not to testify in his own defense.
The nght to call witnesses and to have them subpoenaed under
process of the court if necessary.
'The right to demand a jury trial, without expense to the de-
fendant.
The right to plead guilty or not guilty to the charge against
him, and to have the consequences of his plea explained prior to
entry of the pleas.
The right to take an appeal if he is not satisfied with the judg-
ment of the court.
It has been pointed out that traffic court judges often assume
that defendants know or should know exactly what they can and
cannot do in court. They may feel that with their heavy case load
it is futile to attempt m every case to make sure that the defendant
clearly understands his rights. Too frequently they fail to realize
that the citizen in traffic court is usually in strange surroundings and
going through proceedings which are unfamiliar to lum. "He is," as
one writer put it, "standing in the midst of legal mumbo-jumbo
land: and it f-ightens rather than assures him."30
In particular, the consequences of the plea of guilty require
explanation individually because, m addition to the usual significance
of the plea as it relates to conviction, mandatory suspension of driv-
ing privileges may be involved. Failure to advise of the consequences
of a guilty plea when it involves the mandatory suspension of the
defendant's license to drive has resulted in instances of higher
courts reversing convictions, and countless complaints to motor
vehicle administrators by motorists who did not understand that
their plea would result m license suspension.
Another aspect of the importance of advising the defendant of
his rights has been stressed by the President's Highway Safety
Conference :40
38. ABA and the Traffic Institute, Northwestern University, Judge and
Prosecutor m Traffic Court 80 (1951).
39. Ibid.
40. Report of Committee on Enforcement, President's Highway Safety
Conference 32 (1949).
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justice demands that each violator be individually tried by
the judge and that there be no lining up of defendants waiting to
be tried, in routine or summary fashion irrespective of the rela-
tive lack of seriousness of the violations. This is all the more
important because the monetary sum involved in the average
traffic case dissuades defendants from appealing to another court
for relief.
Devices to explain the defendant's rights to him vary according to
the discretion of the court. Some courts instruct defendants indi-
Vidually, others instruct collectively, some post signs, and some
prepare folders which are handed to all persons entering court so
that they may read while waiting to be called. 41 Not only may the
court attempt to reach the defendant when he comes to court, but
pamphlets for public circulation through bar associations and civic
organizations, and various forms of educational and public rela-
tions contacts may be used to reach the general public outside the
courtroom.
In handling evidence at trial, traffic courts face another
dilemma. It has correctly been observed that almost always there is
but a single issue involved in a traffic case. Also, the judge usually
is given no corroborative or impartial testimony to aid his decision,
but must merely decide whether defendant's story raises a reason-
able doubt.," In the majority of cases the judge must rely as much
on the defendant's character and appearance as the facts. These
factors complicate rather than simplify the task of the judge, and are
part of the basis upon which the public's impression of traffic court
justice is formed. In justice of the peace courts and before local
magistrates in rural areas, it is widely suspected that the court will
invariably prefer to believe the testimony of the law enforcement
officer rather than the accused, especially if the accused is an out-of-
state motorist.4 To many this tendency might not seem surprising,
41. ABA, Report on Courts of Limited jurisdiction in Indiana 134-36(1954). The author has also seen excellent pamphlets prepared for this
purpose in the Municipal Court of Portland, Oregon, Police Court of Brent-
wood, Missouri, Traffic Court of Seattle, Washington, Corporation Court of
Dallas, Texas, and Municipal Court of Lincoln, Nebraska.
42. Warren, op. cit. supra note 22, at 33.
43. Automobile clubs, newspapers, chambers of commerce and public
officials receive a great deal of mail complaining of the treatment reccivedby motorists in traffic courts and in connection with traffic law enforcement.
It is the author's impression that the motivation of most of these complaints
is the feeling that traffic court magistrates accept without question the testimony
of the arresting officer, and regard the testimony of the accused as self-
serving and worthless. Complaints also recite bits of side conversation be-
tween the judge and police which leave the accused with the impression that
he is the victim of a scheme for obtaining municipal revenue rather than
administering justice.
Fisher, op. cit. supra note 34, at 235, has expressed this feeling as fol-
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and might be attributed to the conflict of interest inherent in the
part-time, fee system courts. However, the reported conviction rates
of many of the most progressive urban courts run almost as high.
In Detroit's Recorder's Court, for example, it is reported that ap-
proximately eighty-five per cent of the persons appearing for trial
are found guilty, and many of the remainder have their cases dis-
missed without prejudice because of lack of evidence to support the
charge.
44
Such facts do not, of course, justify the conclusion that traffic
court judges invariably abuse the discretion which the nature of
the issue and the evidence before them forces them to exercise. But
it does suggest that defendants in traffic court find it more difficult
to produce evidence that creates a reasonable doubt as to their
guilt than in other types of cases, and that the presence or absence
of defense counsel in traffic court makes no appreciable difference in
the outcome of the case.
The difficulties of presenting a defense to a traffic charge would
appear to be growing greater with the increased use of scientific
evidence such as chemical tests for intoxication, measurements of
skidmarks to determine braking distance, and measurement of
vehicle speed by so-called radar devices. 45 When such evidence is
presented, courts tend to accept the competence of the evidence
without question. Often statutory presumptions obviate the necessity
of expert testimony on behalf 'of the prosecution where such evi-
dence is used. Faced with this type of situation, there is very little
that the accused can say in his own defense. He finds that his only
avenues of attack on the prosecution's case are to question the
lows; "The typical violator is usually willing enough to swallow his medi-
cine so long as he believes others convicted of si-ilar offenses get the
same prescription. This view probably reflects the attitude of the typical
American motorist: He doesn't complain too vigorously against being pun-
ished for a traffic law violation if he knows he is not being discriminated
against"
Inferential evidence that the motorist's feeling is shared by the bar
may be contained in the remarks of Warren regarding the tactics of defense
counsel m traffic cases. He indicates that instead of defense on the merits
of the charge, their usual approach is to cite technical objections to procedure.
See Warren, op. cit. supra note 22, at 107-10.
44. Correspondence between the author and Walter Seymour of the
Michigan Bar. See also Seymour, The Traffic Ticket, The Detroit Lawyer
123, 124 (Oct. 1952). Here it is stated that a statewide survey in Michigan
showed that 97.49 of all traffic arrests resulted m convictions.
45. Chemical test legislation. see Uniform Vehicle Code, § 11-902,
adopted by" 23 states; see also, Report of National Safety Council, Special
Committee on Chemical Tests for Intoxication (1955). Skidmarks: see
ABA and the Traffic Institute, Northwestern University, Judge and Prose-
cutor in Traffic Court, at 188-89 (1951). Radar- Va. Code Ann. § 46-215.2
(Supp. 1956).
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credibility of the arresting officer's testimony or raise technical
objections to the competency of the evidence. Generally he is not
in a position to do either with any effectiveness because he was
not in a position to fully observe the manner in which the evidence
was obtained. Thus, the statutory presumption attaching to radar
or chemical test evidence may in fact operate as a presumptin of
guilt instead of merely a premsnmptwn of fact designed to render
expert testimony as to competence unnecessary 40
The dilemma of the judge is thus increased. Under the weight
of his case load, and in view of the well-established scientific basis
for recognizing the competence of certain types of evidence, he
must take advantage of presumptions and rely upon this evidence
without reopening basic questions case by case. Of course, such
evidence may be a protection for the innocent defendant against
inaccurate eyewitness testimony Yet, under the weight of his
case load, the traffic court judge may be tempted to accept this type
of evidence without adequate inquiry into the method by which
it is obtained, to the detriment of the defendant.
This combination of factors working to hamper the chances
of defending effectively against traffic charges has its greatest
effect in cases where the law involved is stated in terms of an
absolute prohibition, taking no account of traffic or other conditions.
The best example is the absolute maximum type speed limit which
is expressed in terms of an arbitrary statutory limit rather than a
limit which is reasonable and prudent under the circumstances."
In a state having absolute maximum speed limits and a presumption
in favor of radar evidence, there is no practical way to make a
defense, for the defendant has no way to question the competency
or credibility of the police, and testimony as to the traffic condi-
tions and other circumstances which are within his scope of knowl-
edge are irrelevant.
THE CHANGING ROLE OF TRAFFIC COURTS
Comparison of the way that traffic cases were handled twenty-
five years ago with the way they are handled today suggests that
46. Such was one of the grounds relied upon by petitioner in Dooley v.
Commonwealth, 198 Va. 32, 92 S.E.2d 348 (1956). The Virginia Supreme
Court of Appeals upheld the validity of the statute against attack.
For an excellent treatment of the technical background of radar evidencc
of vehicle speeds and its limitations in court, see Carosell and Coombs,
Radar Evwdence in the Courts, 32 Dicta 323-57 (1955).
47 Marsh, More Flexibility Is Needed in Traffic Control, Traffic Quar-
terly, July 1955, pp. 431-46, Wharton, Must We Have Fake Traffic Laws?
Reader's Digest, Dec. 1955, p. 33, American Autothobile Association, Motor
Vehicle Speed, Its Control and Regqulation (1955).
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the role of traffic courts in the American legal system is changing.
In the simplest terms, this charge seems to be a movement away
from the handling of traffic cases according to the procedure and
standards of judicial proceedings, and toAard the creation of a new
form of administrative proceeding which is a mL\-ture of adjudica-
tion, education and rehabilitation. Since the evolution is not yet
complete, this new system has no name, but certain of its main
features can be described.
Consider first the role of the traffic court as an adjudicative
agency. The tendency of traffic courts in urban and metropolitan
areas is to strive for greater efficiency in handling their case loads
by modifying the procedure generally applicable in criminal cases.
The use of referees, the emphasis on informality, and the reliance
on violations bureaus to dispose of the majority of cases all appear
to be borrowed from our system of administrative law and pro-
cedure. Systematic efforts to encourage the use of these devices are
aided by conditions and practices that discourage the accused
motorist from having the charges against him fully adjudicated by
trial utilizing traditional criminal procedure. In this regard, and
perhaps without realizing it, the "speed trap" courts of many rural
areas have contributed to public acceptance of this situation.
The so-called "point systems," or driver merit rating proce-
dures utilized by many motor vehicle administrators in the exercise
of their power to suspend or revoke driving privileges have also
had a profound effect upon the changing role of the traffic court.' s
Having found that neither the imposition of fines nor the experi-
ence of appearing before the bar of a typical traffic court produces
the desired sobering effect upon motorists charged with minor or
technical violations, traffic courts have laid more and more empha-
sis upon the relationship of their convictions to the suspension or
revocation of driving privileges. 9 When the policy of the licensing
authority has been set forth in a schedule of points or demerits to be
48. Regarding the point system generally, see Baker, Driver Improve-
ment Through Licensing Procedures (1950), Kraft, Driver Control (1954),
Netherton, Highway Safety Under Differing Types of Liability Legislation,
15 Ohio St. L. J. 110-33 (1954).
49. The views of Fisher, op. cit. supra note 34, may be regarded as
typical. " . [A] dangerously large number of drivers do not fear a fine
and some continue to drive recklessly even after a jail sentence or loss
of their driver's license for a limited period. In some cases it would seem
that permanent suspension is the only way to keep them off the road, yet it
is surprising how much sympathy will be forthcoming for the defendant in
such cases. He is still defiant. He takes a chance and drives anyway and
gets caught" See also ABA and the Traffic Institute, Northwestern Univer-
sity, Judge and Prosecutor in Traffic Court 269-72 (1951).
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entered upon the convicted motorist's driving record, a conviction
for a traffic violation tends to be regarded more in the light of its
effect upon the convicted driver's point score rather than in the
light of the penalty directly imposed by the court. Knowing this,
it has become natural for the traffic court judge to consider this
significant in deciding cases, or even to adopt the policy of the
administrator as the policy of the court. 0
Some traffic courts have attempted to combine punishment with
rehabilitation by utilizing the services of administrative agencies of
local government working in the fields of medical services. One
such step toward dealing constructively with "problem drivers" is
the practice of referring them to psychiatric clinics. Detroit's Re-
corder's Court is the outstanding example.51 The traffic and ordi-
nance division of the court was the first traffic court to commence
this practice, beginning in 1936. Referrals to the clinic for examina-
tion are made following conviction and prior to sentence in cases
where the defendant's record of past convictions or accidents gives
reason to suspect the presence of mental or emotional problems.
Full-time doctors on the clinic staff interpret the results of the ex-
aminations and act as advisors to the judge in connection with the
defendant's sentence. Recommendations may include jail sentence,
fines, psychological or psychiatric treatment, commitment to mental
hospitals or other institutions, probation or suspension of driving
privileges. Judicial action upon such advice may involve referral of
the defendant to any of several types of institutions or to the state
driver licensing agency The number of referrals from the traffic
court to the Detroit Psychopathic Clinic has increased annually,
and currently amounts to approximately 1,000 cases per year
"Traffic schools" or "violators' schools" are another rehabilita-
tive device used by traffic courts. Sometimes referred to as extra-
legal punishment, these schools take the form of a series of lectures
and demonstrations dealing with traffic safety Attendance at such
classes may be made a part of the sentence imposed upon a driver
convicted of a traffic violation. In some cities traffic schools are
50. For a description of an attempt to develop a point system for traffic
courts, see Halsey, Michigan's Judicial Point System, 3 Traffic Digest and
Review 5-12 (Aug. 1955).
51. See Canty, The Structure and Function of the Psychopathic Clinic,
Recorder's Court, Detroit, Michigan, 14 Ohio St. L. J. 142-53 (1953) , Canty,
Problem Drivers and Criminal Offenders: A Diagnostic Comparison, 12
Canadian Services Medical Journal 136-43 (1956).
For descriptions of the system used in the Chicago Municipal Court, see
Sheffler, Traffic Courts and Their Role in Traffic Enforcement, 35 Clu. Bar
Rec. 229-30 (1954) , Report on Referrals from the Traffic Courts to the
Psychiatric Institute for May, June and July, 1956.
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operated by the police department; in others by the board of
education, a local safety council, or the traffic court. Cities utilizing
traffic schools have made studies indicating an extremely low per-
centage of repeater-violators among graduates of the school. How-
ever, it is acknowledged that the success or failure of this form of
treatment depends largely upon the skill of those presiding over the
classes and the selection of the students by the court2
The range of experiments with nonlegal devices for rehabilita-
tion of traffic violators is steadily being broadened as research re-
veals more about the causes of accidents and the psychology of
driving. These devices are useful both to the court and to the driver
licensing agency of the state. For the administrative agencies, this
extension of efforts to rehabilitate problem drivers has merely meant
added growth to already existing responsibilities. However, for the
traffic courts, entry into this field of activity has meant that the court
must surround itself with a number of satellite agencies which the
judge directly supervises or wuch the judge may call upon for
consultation.
In connection with the tlurd characteristic of the new type of
proceeding occurring in traffic court the judge assumes the role of
educator. Through his opening remarks about traffic safety and
traffic laws, the judge attempts to give his courtroom audience in-
formation and promote proper public attitudes toward safe driving
and traffic law observance, This effort is carried on case by case
if the judge takes time to explain or moralize in connection with Ins
rulings. His lesson is directed both to the individual defendant and
to the spectators. Often tls educational process is carried to wider
public audiences through press, radio or television publicity. Some-
times the setting is changed with the emphasis placed upon bringing
the public into traffic court as visitors rather than defendants. As a
result the traffic court has often become an auditorium and demon-
stration room for selling traffic safety to the public as well as a forum
for the adjudication of criminal charges.
The readiness of traffic courts to establish a closer working re-
lationslup with administrative agencies and to utilize features of
adinimstrative law and procedure in the handling of traffic cases
has led some to suggest that ultimately the evolutionary process
52. Warren, op. cit. supra note 22, at 173. See also, ABA and the Traffic
Institute, Northwestern Umversity, Judge and Prosecutor m Traffic Court
270-71 (1951), National Safety Council Public Safety Memo No. 89, Driver
Improvement Schools (Jan. 1957), "Who Should Attend Traffic Court
School?" An address by M. Rosenthal to the Traffic Courts Section, National
Safety Congress, 1956.
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will be to replace the traffic courts with administrative tribunals. A
recently published plan for handling traffic cases recommends the
use of special administrative tribunals for all traffic law violations
except such serious charges as hit-and-run driving, negligent
homicide, driving while intoxicated, or driving in defiance of a sus-
pension or revocation of the privilege2. Judicial appeal would lie
from the administrative decision. Under such a system most traffic
law violations would be reclassified so as to make them abuses of
the conditions under which the driving privileges was granted
instead of misdemeanors under the criminal code. Penalties would
be meted out with care to provide the maximum educational or
rehabilitative effect on the driver. Punitive objectives would be
secondary to the objective of identifying and removing from the
highway those drivers who fail to respond to normal deterrent
measures. A specially trained corps of hearing officers would be
located at various convenient offices throughout the state to provide
facilities for speedy hearing and decision of cases. Procedure would
be based on rules in quasi-judicial proceedings before administra-
tive tribunals. Costs of administration would be paid by the state
from funds collected from fines. The results of such a plan, accord-
ing to its author, would be felt not only by the individual defendant
in the form of speedy, convenient, and more enlightened justice,
but by the entire structure of the judicial system of the state. Since
traffic offenses would be removed from the jurisdiction of justices
of the peace, and the various local government courts, the fee
system could be eliminated. Quite possibly, also, public respect
for traffic law enforcement could be increased under a system thus
removed from the influences of local political subdivisions.
A RETURN TO THE IDEAL OF FAIR TRIAL
To complete the evaluation of modern traffic court justice, the
discussion must return to the ideal of fair trial. This is inevitable
because in our society this ideal is one of the symbols of government
which has been entrusted to the courts to preserve. This applies to
traffic courts as well as other courts. In the task of preserving this
symbol, the courts have certain advantages. The ideal of fair trial
is, in large degree, expressed in the concept of due process of law,
which the courts have said may be equated to the community's sense
of decency and belief that prosecutions are being carried forward
free from the whims of men. This allows a certain amount of room
53. Johnston, A Plan for the Hearing and Decidig of Traffic Cases,
33 N.C. L. Rev. 1-16 (1954).
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for courts to alter the rules of criminal procedure as circumstances
may compel. But, at the same time, it imposes a very real and prac-
tical linut on the changes that can be made. When procedure is
altered too much or standards are allowed to deteriorate, the ideal
of fair trial is endangered, and the court fails in its public trust. The
test of whether trial is being rendered fairly generally occurs in
appellate review. But where tius is not available, or where, for other
reasons, appellate review is not sufficiently utilized, the test can only
be made by analyzing the spirit in which the public accepts the trial
court's work.
In the trial of traffic cases, circumstances have compelled the
courts to modify many of the procedural safeguards that apply in
the trial of other crimes. Added to this compulsion of circumstances
has been the influence of the theory that traffic courts should assume
educational and rehabilitative responsibilities toward the defendant
individually and the public generally. Finally, perhaps, the growth
of administrative law to the status of full partnership with other
segments of the legal system has had a considerable effect upon the
search for new techniques and procedures to be used in handling
traffic cases.
The result of changes made m response to these forces has vaned
depending upon which combination 6f factors motivates the court.
However, conditions now prevailing in traffic courts indicate that,
with rare exceptions, the changes that have been made in the name
of greater judicial efficiency have at the same time made it more
difficult for traffic courts to preserve the ideal of fair trial. The
motoring public is generally disinclined either to try cases or appear
as witnesses in traffic court. The "pay-it-and-forget-it" attitude is
expressed by unnecessarily and unjustifiedly pleading guilty in court
or in the violations bureau. In the matter of procedure, innovations
have seldom worked as well m practice as they appeared in theory,
and have lacked complete acceptance by the public. Traffic court
judges have said that their decisions produce "substantal justice,"
but the individual defendant, whose case is to him the most impor-
tant matter on the court's docket, does not think of fair trial
in those terms.
So the dilemma of the traffic court is that in their effort to be-
come efficient in handling their daily case load and inspiring public
support for community traffic safety, they have departed too far
from the standards expected of courts in the trial of criminal cases.
And yet they cannot return to the procedures and ways of other
criminal courts if they hope to handle their case load and function
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as educational and rehabilitative agencies in the cause of traffic
safety Expressed in other terms, it might be said that traffic cases
are currently being handled under procedures and conditions that
are more in the nature of administrative proceedings than judicial
proceedings, and that traffic court judges must shortly decide
whether they will continue as a part of the judicial system at the
sacrifice of the ideal of fair trial, or whether they will find their
place in the legal system as administrative tribunals where they
can carry out their responsibilities free from many of the limitations
that judicial standards impose.
Two ways out of this dilemma may be suggested. One, as has
already been indicated, would involve the reclassification of most
traffic law violations as breaches of the conditions upon which the
driver's license is granted rather than misdemeanors under the
criminal code. As a result, traffic cases could be handled in a system
of administrative tribunals instead of local courts. This quasi-judicial
function could than be integrated with other functions of the
administrative agency, and combined easily and naturally with
those educational and rehabilitative activities that are now recog-
nized as part of the administrator's general responsibility
Such a plan has many attractive aspects, but may be too bold a
step for many state governments to take. Moreover, there is presently
a wide gap between the need to rehabilitate problem drivers and the
means available to carry on such work. Some of this deficiency is
attributable to the lack of basic research on the problems of driver
skills and psychology As this gap is closed, the time may come
when it will become possible to more effectively combine the
processes of adjudication and rehabilitation and assure the success
of such a combined operation.
A second course of action would seem to give promise of im-
proving traffic court justice more immediately This would be a
movement in the direction of eliminating many of the technical and
minor traffic rules from the traffic code, and making those remaining
on the statute books more flexible and realistic. The typical traffic
code today contributes in two ways to making fair trial in traffic
court more difficult. It results in bringing too many persons before
the court on charges that do not actually involve any clear and
present danger to the community, but are rather merely technical
violations of the law As a result, the courts are placed in the
position of working to improve the breed of the motoring public
instead of performing the judicial function of trying and punishing
persons whose acts have endangered public safety Also, to the ex-
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tent that traffic rules have'tended to become absolute standards of
conduct laid down by statute, they have narrowed the area of inquiry
that is possible in a trial. In the nature of tungs, highway traffic
moves in accordance with standards of what is reasonable and
prudent under the circumstances, yet in traffic court the defendant
is frequently judged by standards of conduct arbitrarily set forth
by.the legislature. Traffic law reforms wluch eliminated these two
major handicaps would go far toward making it possible for traffic
courts to function more truly as judicial tribunals and restore faith
that the right of fair trial is as readily available to the citizens in his
role of.a motorist as it is to hun in his other contacts with the law.
